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China recently announced that it is adopting a basket of curren-
cies as the peg for its exchange rate instead of the US dollar. 
This announcement raises questions of how such a system works, 
whether other East Asian countries would be advised to follow 
China in adopting a basket numeraire,1 and whether it would 
be advantageous to these countries if they were all to adopt the 
same basket. This brief answers these questions. 
The ﬁrst section of the brief outlines the concept of the 
numeraire as a basket of currencies and discusses the (distinctly 
limited)  ways  in  which  policy  needs  to  change  when  the 
numeraire consists of such a basket rather than a single currency. 
The  second  section  discusses  which  countries  might  usefully 
choose to adopt a basket numeraire. This section is followed by 
a discussion of the factors that should inﬂuence the composition 
of the basket, and then an analysis of the beneﬁts and costs of 
adopting a common basket for all the East Asian countries rather 
than each of these countries having its own basket. Then there is 
a description of the various regimes in which a basket numeraire 
might be employed: It is argued inter alia that an intermedi-
ate exchange rate regime with a basket peg would constitute a 
useful transitional device pending adoption of either full ﬂoating 
or monetary union, even if in the end it was not a permanent 
feature of the monetary landscape. The ﬁnal section considers 
the objections to a basket numeraire.
The analysis throughout is on East Asian use of a basket 
of currencies as the numeraire. Barry Eichengreen (2005) has 
discussed a somewhat diﬀerent proposal: the creation of a paral-
lel currency, whose value would be deﬁned as a basket of the 
East Asian currencies, for use in East Asia.2 He points out that 
this would be similar to the road previously pursued in Europe, 
which  created  a  European  parallel  currency  (ﬁrst  the  ECU, 
subsequently the euro) after it had adopted ﬂoating exchange 
rates against the rest of the world. Since European countries had 
abandoned  systematic  attempts  to  manage  their  currencies 
against the outside world, there would have been little role for 
a basket of the sort discussed here. Of course, floating meant 
that there was no institutional constraint that prevented Euro-
pean exchange rates collectively drifting into misalignments 
against third currencies like the dollar, although devotees of 
floating exchange rates doubted this would occur (which did 
not prevent it from happening in spades). 
Note that there would be nothing to preclude a group of 
countries that had adopted a basket of outside currencies as their 
numeraire from also creating a basket of their own currencies, to 
form, for example, an embryonic regional money as suggested 
by Eichengreen. Nor is there anything to prevent a basket whose 
purpose is to stabilize exchange rates (rather than to form an  1. The numeraire is the unit in terms of which a currency’s value is measured. 
A particular case is a ﬁxed, or “pegged” currency, where the currency is ﬁxed in 
terms of some other unit, typically some other currency but on a number of 
occasions a basket of currencies. (A ﬂoating currency may also have a numeraire 
when the ﬂoat is managed with reference to its value in terms of a single currency 
or a basket.)
2. A parallel currency is a currency that, as the name would suggest, circulates in 
parallel to the national currency and is also oﬃcially endorsed in some way.
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embryonic regional money) from including both external and 
regional currencies. Indeed, we shall subsequently compare the 
merits of baskets that contain both types of currencies with a 
basket that contains just extraregional currencies.
THE CONCEPT OF A BASKET NUMERAIRE
Single-currency pegs are simple and familiar. Some currency—
say, for the sake of concreteness, the Chinese renminbi—has a 
declared or de facto central rate in terms of some international 
currency like the US dollar (as the renminbi did when this 
brief was drafted). The central bank undertakes to hold the 
market exchange rate in a band, within some margin of the 
central rate, by means of intervention.3  If the dollar appreci-
ates or depreciates against most other currencies, then China 
has to ensure that its exchange rate against the dollar remains 
constant (except to the extent that it moves within the band), 
so that the renminbi also appreciates or depreciates against 
most other currencies along with the dollar (subject to the 
same qualiﬁcation).
  A basket peg replaces the obligation to hold the exchange 
rate within a ﬁxed margin of the peg currency by an obliga-
tion to hold it within a ﬁxed margin of a constant nominal 
value of a basket of currencies. Let us suppose, to be concrete 
(while taking an example that might be reasonably realistic), 
that China adopted a basket of currencies consisting of 40 
percent of the dollar, 30 percent of the yen, and 30 percent 
of the euro as its peg.4 Until July 21, 2005, China was using 
the dollar as a peg and also doing all its intervention and, it is 
believed, holding most of its reserves in dollars. What is the 
eﬀect of adoption of the basket (a) in terms of its intervention 
and reserve-holding policies and (b) in terms of the impact 
of a 10 percent appreciation of the yen and the euro vis-à-vis 
the dollar?
Many people are surprised to learn that there need be 
no impact whatsoever on which currency is used to conduct 
intervention or on how the country holds its reserves. The only 
diﬀerence made by the switch from a dollar peg to a basket peg 
is that the dollar value of the intervention points will change 
when the dollar changes in terms of the other currencies in 
the basket. But if the dollar is the most convenient currency 
with which to intervene, then it is sensible to continue to 
conduct intervention in dollars: There is no necessity at all to 
start intervening in a basket of currencies.5  It is also possible 
to continue holding reserves entirely in the form of dollars. 
This would of course imply that the domestic-currency value 
of reserves would vary when the dollar’s value changes in terms 
of the other currencies in the basket. If the Chinese authorities 
dislike that, they can either diversify their reserve holdings so 
that they hold reserves in the same proportions as in the basket 
to which they are pegging, or they can take out appropriate 
cover in the forward market.6 They may do either, or they may 
do nothing, but in any event they can operate a basket peg.
After its 2.1 percent revaluation and adoption of a band of 
+/– 0.3 percent, and with unchanged dollar/euro and dollar/
yen exchange rates, China initially committed to intervene to 
prevent appreciation of the renminbi to less than 8.0869 yuan 
per dollar, or to prevent depreciation of the renminbi to more 
than 8.1353 yuan to the dollar (+/– 0.3 percent around its 
central rate of 8.1111 yuan to the dollar). What would be 
the impact of a 10 percent appreciation of the yen and the 
euro relative to the dollar? Since the yen and euro constitute 
collectively 60 percent of the basket, this appreciation will 
require  the  authorities  to  increase  their  dollar  intervention 
limits by 6 percent. After appreciation of the yen and euro, 
the People’s Bank of China would have to prevent an apprecia-
tion above 7.6292 yuan per dollar and prevent depreciation 
below 7.6748 yuan per dollar. The band would still be +/– 0.3 
percent around the central rate, which would be the same in 
terms of the basket of currencies, but that rate would now 
amount to 7.6520 yuan per dollar.
Table 1 shows some ﬁgures for the impact of changes 
in the dollar/euro and yen/dollar rates on the central rate of 
the renminbi. A 10 percent appreciation of either the euro or 
3. The width of the band is deﬁned as twice that margin.
4. At the exchange rates prevailing on the day this was ﬁrst written, of $1 = 
¥105.6 = € 0.776, this would imply that a basket with a value of $1 would 
consist of $0.40, ¥ 31.7, and € 0.233. (China has not in fact published the 
composition of its basket, so I don’t claim this represents the actual Chinese 
basket. Indeed, the Chinese have indicated that their basket contains more 
than three currencies.)
5. For conﬁrmation of this view from someone who was intimately concerned 
with operating a basket peg (in Iceland), see Gudmundsson (2005). Since 
the existence of a basket peg does not imply a need to intervene against third 
currencies, it also need not limit the deviations of cross-rates from the previous 
day’s central rates. The Chinese commitment to limit such deviations to 1.5 
percent is unwise because it could oblige them to attempt to defend broken 
cross-rates.
6. Gudmundsson (2005) asserts that many central banks use a minimum 
variance analysis to determine the composition of their reserves and that they 
will usually select their reserves from a subset of the currencies that enter their 
basket (those with high liquidity, etc.). The vehicle (intervention) currency 
will typically receive a greater weight than in the currency basket precisely 
because of its liquidity.
There would be no difficulty, 
let alone mystery, in adopting 
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the yen in terms of the dollar would decrease the renminbi’s 
dollar central rate to 7.875, while if they both appreciated 
simultaneously by 10 percent, the central rate would move 
to 7.652. Conversely, a depreciation of either the euro or the 
yen in terms of the dollar would increase the renminbi/dollar 
central rate (with identical eﬀects because they both have a 30 
percent weight in the basket), and a simultaneous increase 
in both would have twice the effect. Since the dollar may 
appreciate rather than depreciate in terms of the euro and 
yen, a shift of the renminbi to a basket valuation is not 
a substitute for an upfront revaluation: It might lead to 
a subsequent depreciation rather than an appreciation of 
the renminbi against the dollar.
It is not diﬃcult to obtain instantaneous market quota-
tions of exchange rates for the major currencies. These can be 
fed into a computer, which can give a ﬁgure of the implied 
dollar  intervention  points  in  real  time.  The  central  bank’s 
market operators will know that they have an obligation to 
prevent the market exchange rate from varying outside those 
limits. There is no difficulty, let alone mystery, in adopting 
and operating a basket peg. The contention that used to 
be advanced—that market operators (who are accustomed 
to dealing in large volumes of far more complex derivative 
instruments) would be unable to comprehend the system—
was, shall we say, far-fetched.
As pointed out earlier, a basket numeraire is more general 
than the concept of a basket peg. It includes the possibility 
that the country will have a ﬁxed peg, but it also allows the 
possibility  of  a  managed  ﬂoating  exchange  rate,  where  the 
management is motivated by a desire to limit misalignments 
in terms of the numeraire.7  A country with a managed ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate and a numeraire consisting of a basket of 
currencies  would  regard  its  currency  as  strong  or  weak  in 
relation to whether its value was above or below some norm 
(its central rate) deﬁned in terms of the basket of curren-
cies. Alternatively, if the country worries about whether its 
currency is strengthening or weakening, it will look at whether 
its currency is gaining or losing value in terms of the basket 
of currencies.
The  analysis  in  this  brief  presupposes  a  constant  new 
central  rate,  as  if  China  had  ﬁxed  a  new,  constant  central 
rate in terms of the basket on July 2, 2005. In fact, China 
reserved the right—which it already had, though it had gone 
unused for a decade—to change the central rate by up to 0.3 
percent on any day. It remains to be seen whether this right 
is actively used in the coming months. First indications are 
that the Chinese authorities do not intend to use this ﬂex-
ibility  to  engineer  an  additional,  gradual  appreciation,  but 
many observers believe that the logic of events will ultimately 
convince them that such appreciation is in China’s interest.
COUNTRIES IN EAST ASIA THAT MIGHT ADOPT 
A BASKET NUMERAIRE
The example used in the previous section concerned China, 
but there are a number of other countries in East Asia that 
might  also  beneﬁt  by  adopting  a  basket  numeraire.  These 
are largely among the signatories of the Chiang-Mai Initia-
tive. The obvious candidates are the ﬁve long-standing large 
members  of  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)—Indonesia,8 Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,9  
and  Thailand;  the  three  signatories  of  Chiang-Mai  from 
Northeast Asia—China, Korea, and Japan; plus perhaps the 
distinct currency areas that are part of Greater China—Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.10 Perhaps the recent members of ASEAN 
Table 1:  Impact on dollar parity of renminbi under a basket peg
Appreciation      Appreciation           Appreciation 
                                                   of euro                    of yen                    of euro and yen
      
+ 10 percent        7.875  7.875  7.652
No change      8.111   8.111   8.111
–10 percent      8.354   8.354   8.598
Source: Author’s calculations on the assumption that the basket consists 40 percent of the 
dollar, 30 percent of the euro, and 30 percent of the yen.
7. One could also express the value of an unmanaged ﬂoating exchange rate 
in terms of a numeraire, but if there is no management, this is a mathematical 
exercise of no policy consequence, except insofar as it might increase awareness 
of events.
8. However, in a previous study I concluded that Indonesia’s trade pattern 
made it a less compelling candidate for using the same basket than other 
countries of the region (Williamson 1999).
9. Brunei pegs its currency rigidly to the Singapore dollar, so it would be 
included indirectly if Singapore adopted a common basket as its numeraire.
10. I ignore the political problem this might pose.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1     A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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Table 2:  Direction of trade of East Asian economies, 2004 (percent)
                          Non-US    Rest of
    United                                         European                        Western                 non-Japan                 Rest of
Country    States    Japan    Union    Hemisphere  East Asiac  worldd
China   
Exports    22.8    12.4    18.1    4.6    30.1    12.1
Imports      7.7    16.1    12.4    4.8    39.4    19.5
Total    15.2    14.3    15.3    4.7    34.8    15.8
Hong Kong
Exports    17.0      5.3    14.0    2.7    55.3      5.8
Imports      5.3    12.1      8.0    2.0    67.6      4.9
Total    11.1      8.7    11.0    2.3    61.5      5.3
Indonesia 
Exports    13.5    21.8    14.3    2.1    35.6    12.7
Imports      5.7    19.3    12.1    2.5    43.3    17.1
Total      9.6    20.5    13.2    2.3    39.4    14.9
South Korea 
Exports    17.8       8.3    13.8    6.3    41.4    12.5
Imports    12.7    21.6    10.8    3.4    28.8    22.7
Total    15.3    14.9    12.3    4.8    35.1    17.6
Malaysia
Exports    18.8    10.1    12.6    1.8    44.6    12.2
Imports    14.6    16.1    12.1    1.6    47.4      8.1
Total    16.7    13.1    12.3    1.7    46.0    10.2
Philippines 
Exports    17.5    15.8    15.5    1.9    46.6      2.8
Imports    16.0    20.6      8.8    1.8    42.1    10.8
Total    16.7    18.2    12.1    1.8    44.3      6.8
 
Singapore
Exports    13.0      6.4    14.5    2.1    51.9    12.1
Imports    12.7    11.7    13.5    1.4    45.2    15.5
Total    12.9      9.1    14.0    1.7    48.5    13.8
Taiwana 
Exports    18.0      8.3    11.3    n.a.    48.2    n.a.
Imports    13.2    25.6      9.9    n.a.    30.1    n.a.
Total    15.6    17.0    10.6    n.a.    39.2    n.a.
Thailand 
Exports    15.9    13.9    14.7    2.6    38.8    14.1
Imports      7.6    23.6      9.9    2.3    34.4    22.2
Total    11.8    18.7    12.3    2.5    36.6    18.2
Weighted averageb
Exports    18.3    11.3    14.9    4.1    40.3    11.1
Imports      9.5    15.9    10.6    3.5    43.5    16.9
Total    13.9    13.6    12.7    3.8    41.9    14.0
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(namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) would be 
involved, too, but the present assessment is restricted to the 
more traditional candidates.
Table  2  shows  the  direction  of  trade  of  each  of  these 
economies in the most recent year for which data are available, 
2004. It also shows the average direction of trade (weighting 
by country trade levels) of nine of the candidates listed above, 
but  excludes  Japan.  Finally,  since  India  is  now  sometimes 
grouped with the East Asian countries, its direction of trade 
is also shown.
All nine countries for which the trade data are averaged 
have strong intraregional trade relations, and all have fairly 
diversiﬁed extraregional trade. Intraregional trade is almost 35 
percent in the case of China and in most other cases even 
higher. Extraregional trade is in most cases over 10 percent 
with each of the three main trading blocs. China is fairly typi-
cal in its trading pattern: True, it runs a deﬁcit with the rest 
of non-Japan East Asia, but so (unsurprisingly, arithmetic 
being what it is) do about half the other countries of the 
region. The important asymmetries occur between exports and 
imports, where most of the countries export much more to 
than they import from the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
the European Union, while all countries import more from 
Japan than they export to it.11 Japan and India are subject 
to the same patterns, except that India trades much less 
with East Asia (including Japan) than do any of the other 
countries under study.
These  considerations  make  it  reasonable  to  consider 
adopting a basket numeraire, or a common basket numeraire, 
for the nine economies of developing East Asia shown in the 
top portion of table 2. On grounds of trade composition, 
there  seems  no  compelling  reason  to  exclude  Japan. The 
argument  for  not  including  Japan  in  the  determination 
of a common East Asian basket numeraire is different. If 
Table 2  (continued)
                          Non-US      Rest of
    United                                       European                        Western                    non-Japan            Rest of 
Country    States    Japan    Union    Hemisphere   East Asiac              worldd
Japan 
Exports    22.7    n.a.    15.8      5.4    47.6      8.5
Imports    14.0    n.a.    12.7      4.6    44.6    24.1
Total    18.4    n.a.    14.3      5.0    46.1    16.3
India
Exports    18.4    3.5    22.6     3.4    22.9    29.3
Imports      7.0    3.5    23.1     5.2    24.2    37.0
Total    12.7    3.5    22.9     4.3    23.5    33.1
a. Data for Taiwan are from Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, 2004, tables 122 and 123. Due to incomplete country detail, 
non-US Western Hemisphere cannot be calculated, and rest of world is left out as a result. Incomplete country detail further means 
that Taiwan’s imports from the EU consist only of imports from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland 
(included because it has an FTA with the EU), and Britain.  Taiwan’s exports to the EU consist only of exports to Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Britain. All data are for 2003.
b. For the weighted average, Taiwan has been excluded due to incomplete data. Due to inconsistent reporting by countries, weights 
do not add up to exactly 100 percent but have been deﬂated by the actual sum to yield a total of 100 percent.
c. Non-Japan East Asia is the aggregate in the International Monetary Fund DOTS database for “Developing Asia” (excluding only 
Japan),  subtracting  where  applicable  Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,  Bhutan,  Sri  Lanka,  India,  Maldives,  Nepal,  Pakistan,  Palau,  and 
Timor. As the aggregate does not equal the sum of individual countries, Taiwan is assumed to be included in aggregate, which in 
addition contains, where applicable, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Asia not elsewhere reported (nes).
d. Residual calculated as 1 minus other ﬁve categories.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, May 2005.
11. This is a striking example of triangular trade, which economists know 
to be a good thing, although politicians at their worst sometimes get excited 
about the bilateral imbalances it implies.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1     A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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Japan used the basket numeraire, then the basket would of 
necessity exclude the Japanese yen. But if the yen continued 
to fluctuate as violently as it has in the past, this would mean 
that the other countries of East Asia would have significant 
variations in their effective exchange rates12 even though they 
stabilized their rates in terms of the dollar-euro basket. What 
seems more prudent would be for Japan to use as numeraire a 
dollar-euro basket with weights proportionate to their weights 
in the East Asian basket. If and when Japan shows that it is 
capable of limiting the ﬂuctuations of the yen in terms of that 
basket to a reasonable magnitude, then it would become a 
candidate for admission to the East Asian basket. 
India’s direction of trade is quite substantially diﬀerent 
from that of East Asia (much more out of line with the regional 
norm than that of Indonesia), with a much more substantial 
volume of trade with Europe and markedly less with Japan 
and the rest of East Asia. This does not constitute an argument 
against India adopting a basket numeraire, but it does consti-
tute a reason for eschewing a common basket numeraire. If 
India were to decide to use a basket numeraire, it should use 
its own basket, reﬂecting its own trade composition. 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BASKET
An  old  literature,  which  I  surveyed  in  1982  (Williamson 
1982), discusses the concept of the optimal peg. “Optimality” 
of its nature requires that one deﬁne the objective that is envis-
aged. It was generally agreed that in this context an optimal 
peg should minimize the macroeconomic disturbance caused 
to an economy by the shocks it encounters from the near-
random ﬂuctuations in the exchange rates of major currencies. 
Just what is implied by macroeconomic stability—stability in 
the relative price of traded goods, or stability of output—
varied by author, but in either event it transpired that the 
optimal peg was that which kept the effective exchange rate 
constant. 
A series of subsidiary questions concern whether weights 
in the eﬀective exchange rate should be based on imports, 
exports,  or  total  trade;  whether  to  use  trade  weights  or 
elasticity weights; whether weights should be based on the 
direction  of  trade  or  the  currency  of  denomination;  and 
whether to stabilize the nominal or real eﬀective exchange 
rate. I concluded that the arguments favored using total trade 
weights rather than giving diﬀerent treatment to exports or 
imports; using elasticity weights if these are available (which 
they usually won’t be, but trade weights should be a reasonable 
proxy); using the direction of trade rather than the currency 
of denomination; and relying on the choice of peg just to 
stabilize the nominal exchange rate. It also appears that large 
baskets add extra complexity without having much impact on 
the behavior of the basket; if country B does not contribute 
more than 5 percent of country A’s trade, then its currency 
probably ought not appear in country A’s basket.
Applying this analysis to East Asia, one would look to 
each country using as numeraire a basket of the currencies 
of those countries with which it conducts more than, say, 5 
percent of its total trade, with weights equal to the value of 
trade with that country divided by the value of total trade 
with all the countries that will make up the basket. Table 3 
shows those countries with which each of the nine countries 
conducts 5 percent or more of its total trade. It can be seen 
that this would involve in each case the three major trading 
powers (the United States, the eurozone, and Japan) and a 
number of other East Asian countries that would vary between 
one country (just China, in the case of Hong Kong) and four 
countries  (in  the  cases  of  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines). 
The Chinese renminbi would be in all the baskets, except, of 
course, that of China itself.
One issue of principle is obvious: Should the basket 
consist of all major trading partners, or should it be restricted 
to extraregional trading partners? If one wishes all countries 
to use a common basket, then only the latter is feasible. One 
cannot  use  as  numeraire  a  common  basket  that  includes 
countries within the region, for the basic reason that, for 
example, the Chinese basket would of necessity exclude the 
renminbi while the baskets of other East Asian countries 
would all include it. Thus we may consider two options: 
one in which each of the nine countries uses a basket that 
includes other East Asian currencies and is based on its own 
trade pattern and one in which it uses a common basket of 
. . . adopting a common basket . . . 
would guarantee that no change in 
third-country exchange rates would 
disturb the trading relationships among 
the East Asian countries themselves. 
12. The eﬀective exchange rate is a country’s average, trade-weighted exchange 
rate. It is the eﬀective rate—not the the bilateral rate against a particular 
currency such as the dollar—that has macroeconomic implications for output, 
inﬂation, and employment.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1   A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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Table 3:  Major bilateral trade partners (5 percent or more weight 
   for a currency area), 2004
                       Total trade
East Asian country    Partner country                          weights (percent)
China      Eurozone       13
      Japan        14
      United States      16
      Hong Kong      12
      South Korea        7
Hong Kong    Eurozone         8
      Japan          9
      United States      11
      China        44
Indonesia     Eurozone       11
      Japan        21
      United States      10
      China          9
      Malaysia          6
      Singapore        8
      South Korea        5
Malaysia      Eurozone       10
      Japan        13
      United States      17
      China          8
      Hong Kong        5
      Singapore      13
Philippines    Eurozone       10
      Japan        18
      United States      17
      China          9
      Hong Kong        7
      Malaysia          5
      Singapore        8
Singapore    Eurozone       11
      Japan          9
      United States      13
      China          9
      Malaysia        15
South Korea    Eurozone       10
      Japan        15
      United States      15
      China        18
Taiwana      Eurozone         9
      Japan        16
      United States      16
      China        12
      Hong Kong      11
Thailand      Eurozone         9
      Japan        19
      United States      12
      China          8
      Malaysia          6
      Singapore        6
a. Taiwan data for 2003 are from the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2004. 
Eurozone includes only Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, May 2005.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1     A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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extraregional currencies (in practice dollar, euro, and yen). 
The alternative sets of baskets are shown in table 4.13  The 
next section considers what criteria would be appropriate in 
choosing between these two options.
INDIVIDUAL-COUNTRY BASKETS OR 
A COMMON BASKET?
There are several obvious advantages in adopting a common 
basket rather than each country having a tailor-made basket 
based on its individual trade pattern. In particular, this would 
guarantee  that  no  change  in  third-country  exchange  rates 
would disturb the trading relationships among the East Asian 
countries themselves. Such insulation of the trading relation-
ships of the region from outside disturbances is the major 
objective  of  adopting  a  common  peg.  Ronald  McKinnon 
(2002), for example, has often emphasized this as one of the 
major beneﬁts of the region having a common dollar peg, but 
it is an advantage that could equally well be gained by adopt-
ing a common basket peg. But there are other advantages, too. 
It would, for example, also create a propitious environment 
for further advances toward regional monetary integration, 
should  that  be  the  desired  goal,  since  it  would  build  in  a 
presumption of stability among the participating currencies. 
And it would make it easier to arrive at a Plaza-type agree-
ment, under which all the countries of developing East Asia 
adjusted their currency values simultaneously. 
Against  such  advantages,  the  question  that  inevitably 
arises  is  whether  use  of  a  common  basket  would  provide 
adequate  stability  of  the  participating  countries’  eﬀective 
exchange rates.14 Kawai and Takagi (undated) established that 
stability of the real eﬀective exchange rate is important for 
macroeconomic  stability  in  the  East  Asian  countries.  One 
way of seeking to answer the question of the implications of 
a common basket for stability of the eﬀective exchange rates 
is to simulate how exchange rates would have moved in East 
Asia  under  the  alternative  policies,  using  the  extraregional 
exchange rate changes of some past period. For this purpose 
I have taken the behavior of exchange rates over the ﬁve-year 
period 2000–04. Table 5 shows a measure of exchange rate 
volatility for each of the countries—namely, the standard error 
of its end-month nominal eﬀective exchange rate, under (a) 
actual historical experience, (b) a peg to an individual-country 
basket as shown in table 4, and (c) a peg to a common basket 
as shown in table 4. Note that in order to make such simu-
lations it is necessary to assume that countries have a rigid 
peg to their basket so that the exchange rates of participating 
currencies were always equal to their central rates. In a wide 
band or reference rate system, one would clearly not expect 
this to be true, as actual changes will not be pinned down by 
the system. But there is no reason to expect that a change in 
third-currency exchange rates will have a systematic eﬀect in 
altering the position of the currency relative to its central rate, 
so this seems a neutral assumption. It was also assumed that 
all the other Western Hemisphere currencies move with the 
dollar and that 40 percent of the rest of the world currencies 
move with the dollar, 40 percent move with the euro, and 20 
percent move with the yen.
In three of the nine cases (Singapore, South Korea, and 
Thailand), an individual-country peg would actually have led 
to more instability than the historical experience. Conceiv-
ably, this effect is an artifact arising from the measurement 
of the eﬀective exchange rate in column 2, purely on the basis 
of the major trading partners rather than the more compre-
hensive base the IMF uses. However, an economic explana-
tion might also lie behind this paradoxical finding: perhaps 
the dollar peg (in some cases) or near-peg (in others) had the 
McKinnon  effect  of  reducing  intraregional  exchange  rate 
instability. However, it can also be seen that in seven of the 
nine cases a common basket peg would actually have reduced 
instability compared both with actual historical experience 
and with the individual-country basket. (The differences in 
the other two cases, Hong Kong and Singapore, are trivial.) 
The common basket peg would have produced the McKin-
non effect by eliminating intraregional instability, as well as 
reducing the effective instability against the outside world. 
In other words, there is no trade-off between the advantage 
of an individual-country basket in stabilizing the effective 
exchange rate and the common basket in stabilizing trade 
relations within East Asia: The common basket is so useful 
in the latter capacity that it outperforms individual-country 
13. The “own baskets” shown in the ﬁrst column are based on all the trade 
partners (by currency area) with which each of the countries involved does 
more than 5 percent of its total trade, as shown in table 3. The trade weights 
shown in that table were summed, and then each was multiplied by the inverse 
of the sum to derive the trade weights. The “common basket” shown in col-
umn 2 was derived from the weighted average (total trade) line of table 2. The 
non-US Western Hemisphere was added to the dollar, the rest of non-Japan 
East Asia was disregarded, and the rest of world column was added 40 percent 
to the dollar, 40 percent to the euro, and 20 percent to the yen. The resulting 
shares for dollar, euro, and yen were then transformed into weights that added 
to 100 percent.
14. It may also be contended that the rest of the world might prefer indi-
vidual-country baskets because they could result in a larger dollar appreciation 
by East Asia in response to an appreciation by euro and yen. However, this is 
erroneous; it is true that individual-country baskets would lead to a series of 
secondary appreciations in response to the initial appreciations of other East 
Asian countries, but these secondary appreciations merely oﬀset the smaller 
initial appreciation in response to the euro and yen appreciations that would 
result from their collective weight in the basket being in the range of 28 to 53 
percent rather than 60 percent.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1   A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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Table 4:  Basket weights for nine East Asian currencies (percent)
Country                 Own basket            Common basket
China      Dollar    20.9    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    22.9    Euro    31.6
      Yen    25.1    Yen    28.2
      HK dollar   19.3      
      Won    11.8 
    
Hong Kong    Dollar    11.4    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    12.3    Euro    31.6
      Yen    15.4    Yen    28.2
      RMB    61.0   
   
Indonesia    Dollar    16.1    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    29.7    Euro    31.6
      Yen    14.9    Yen    28.2
      RMB    12.8      
      MYR      7.9      
      Sing. dollar  11.6      
      Won      7.0
      
Malaysia      Dollar    15.0    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    19.5    Euro    31.6
      Yen    25.8    Yen    28.2
      RMB    12.4      
      HK dollar     6.9      
      Sing. dollar  20.3 
    
Philippines    Dollar    13.8    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    24.5    Euro    31.6
      Yen    22.5    Yen    28.2
      RMB    12.6      
      HK dollar     9.1      
      MYR      6.6      
      Sing. dollar  10.9   
   
Singapore    Dollar    19.0    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    15.7    Euro    31.6
      Yen    22.5    Yen    28.2
      RMB    16.2      
      MYR    26.7 
    
South Korea    Dollar    17.6    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    25.4    Euro    31.6
      Yen    26.6    Yen    28.2
      RMB    30.4 
    
Taiwan      Dollar    14.1    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    25.5    Euro    31.6
      Yen    24.5    Yen    28.2
      RMB    18.6      
      HK dollar   17.2
      
Thailand     Dollar    16.0    Dollar    40.2
      Euro    31.5    Euro    31.6
      Yen    19.9    Yen    28.2 
      RMB    13.4         
      MYR      9.5        
      Sing. dollar    9.8 
    
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, May 2005.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1     A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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baskets in stabilizing effective exchange rates, too. 
In China’s case, an individual-country basket would have 
somewhat reduced the instability of the eﬀective exchange rate, 
demonstrating the wisdom of China’s recent decision to adopt 
a basket peg. This is worth noting because Chinese oﬃcials   
often defended China’s policy of ﬁxing the bilateral exchange 
rate as one calculated to preserve exchange rate stability. This 
is so only in the most superﬁcial sense: The actual consequence 
was far more instability in what matters from the standpoint 
of economic policy: the eﬀective exchange rate. However, a 
common basket would reduce the instability of China’s eﬀec-
tive exchange rate even more. In the two other cases where there 
were ﬁxed dollar pegs, Hong Kong and Malaysia, an individual 
basket  peg  would  also  have  reduced  eﬀective  instability.  A 
common basket would still have delivered signiﬁcantly greater 
stability of the eﬀective exchange rate in Malaysia, but margin-
ally less stability in Hong Kong. A common basket thus seems 
to be of substantial potential beneﬁt in most countries because 
it stabilizes exchange rates among the East Asian countries, 
which are now important trading partners, and it does this 
without the danger of destabilizing the eﬀective exchange rate, 
which arises from them all using a common dollar peg.
A BASKET NUMERAIRE AND REGIME CHOICE
One of the advantages of a basket numeraire is that it is consis-
tent with a wide range of alternative exchange rate systems. It 
could be used where a country has an old-fashioned narrow-
margins peg, like China still has, or where a country has a 
ﬁrmer commitment to an unchanged rate than this, as Hong 
Kong does.15  And it could also be used where a country already 
has an intermediate regime, with wide margins and the possi-
15. Of course, this would mean committing to keeping the value of the Hong 
Kong dollar unchanged in terms of the basket of currencies rather than of the 
US dollar.
Table 5:   Standard deviations of East Asian nominal eﬀective exchange rates under 
    diﬀerent pegs,  2000–04 (percent)
          Actual historical                       Individual-country               Common 
Country                        experiencea               pegb                basket pegc
China        5.21        4.38      2.32
Hong Kong      4.18        2.03      2.43
Indonesiaa      6.35        6.32      3.55
Malaysia       5.29        3.44      1.89
Philippines      9.55      12.91      5.08
Singapore      2.54        1.78      2.54
South Koreab      3.32        3.96      1.78
Taiwana, d      4.74        4.72      1.80
Thailandb      2.92        3.55      1.89
a.  Standard deviations of period-end monthly nominal eﬀective exchange rates (NEER) are from International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (May 2005). Data for Indonesia and Taiwan end-month are 
from Thomson Datastream Series JPMIDNB (Indonesia) and NTDTWER (Taiwan). Data for South Korea and 
Thailand end-month real eﬀective exchange rates are from the Citibank CTERI database (January 2000 = 100).
b. NEER with individual-country pegs are calculated as follows: The weights shown in table 4, column 1, were 
used to calculate what the dollar exchange rate (the local currency unit, or LCU, divided by the dollar) would 
have been. Actual exchange rates against the dollar were used to derive other hypothetical rates. These were 
combined with the trade weights to estimate a hypothetical time path for the NEER. The standard deviation of 
that path is reported in the table. All bilateral exchange rates are set at January 2000 = 100.
c. Common basket pegs are calculated using 1999 as the base year ($1 = €0.9363 and $1 = ¥ 113.91), with 
the weights in table 4, column 2, yielding a dollar, euro, and yen composition of ¢40.2, €0.296, and ¥32.1, 
respectively. From these, the LCU/$, €, and ¥ implied by the basket composition and dollar/euro/yen exchange 
rates are calculated. These are weighted by the individual-country trade weights to yield the NEERs with the 
common basket peg. All bilaterial exchange rates are set at January 2000 = 100.
d. Due to insuﬃcient trade data detail for Taiwan (table 2), the trade for non-US Western Hemisphere and 
rest of the world have not been distributed for Taiwan. Trade weights are based only on trade with the United 
States, European Union, and Japan.N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1   A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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bility of small changes in the central rate, like Singapore. 
A basket numeraire could even be used where a coun-
try has a managed ﬂoat, provided that it is willing to have 
its intervention disciplined by its (basket) central rate. One 
possibility is for the agreed central rate to act as a “reference 
rate,” meaning that the country accepts an obligation not to 
intervene (or adopt other policies intended to have the same 
eﬀect) in a way that would tend to push the market rate away 
from the reference rate. Thus the country would ﬂoat in the 
sense that it accepted no obligation to defend a particular 
rate, but it would undertake not to try to override the market 
when market forces were tending to push the rate toward the 
reference rate. Such a basket reference rate implies something 
other  than  freely  ﬂoating  exchange  rates  on  the  American 
model, with no thought of where the equilibrium rate is or 
whether the market rate is anywhere near a plausible concept 
of equilibrium, but it does not necessarily imply very much 
more than this.
This wide range of circumstances under which a basket 
numeraire could be used is an advantage in a region like East 
Asia, where there is not as yet a high degree of monetary cohe-
sion. Diﬀerent countries at present operate very diﬀerent poli-
cies, and it is likely that they will continue to want to operate 
in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways. However, if they all used similar 
baskets, or even more clearly, if they all based their policies on 
a common basket, they would not need to worry about the 
danger of being undercut by their neighbors as an incidental 
by-product of changes in the exchange rates of third parties, as 
they do at the moment. If the dollar-euro rate changed, they 
would all react similarly to the shock, and thus none of them 
need consider the possibility of additional reactions or worry 
that diﬀerent reactions of their neighbors would undermine 
their competitiveness. 
General  adoption  of  a  basket  numeraire  in  the  region 
would also obviate the danger of a recurrence of the experience 
of the past three years, in which the rest of the world perceives 
the region to have “ridden the dollar down” and thus gained 
competitiveness  against  most  non-Asian,  nondollar  curren-
cies as a by-product of the weakness of the dollar. This is why 
adoption of a basket peg is often viewed outside the region as 
one aspect of a move to limited ﬂexibility. 
However,  adoption  of  a  basket  numeraire  would  do 
nothing  to  oﬀset  the  competitiveness  gain  that  the  region 
has already registered as a result of past dollar depreciation. 
Neutralizing this gain will require some additional action to 
strengthen real exchange rates, either nominal appreciation or 
inﬂation. Thus the possibility of adopting a basket does not 
eliminate the need for an initiative on the part of countries 
like China. On the contrary, one can argue that, in order to 
give a fair chance to a system of limited ﬂexibility, the system 
must start oﬀ at a point at which the market believes it to be 
free of a big disequilibrium inherited from the past, which 
would be possible in the near future only with an upfront 
revaluation greater than 2.1 percent.
Another major element of a system of limited ﬂexibil-
ity would be wide margins. George Halm’s inﬂuential paper 
(1965) suggested that “wide” might be +/– 6 percent, but 
after the 1993 exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis, the 
Europeans went to +/– 15 percent, so there is ample scope for 
selecting a ﬁgure to suit local tastes while remaining within the 
limits for which there is a precedent. 
The ﬁnal element of a system of limited ﬂexibility would 
be a willingness to change the central rate relatively readily in 
response to pressures like balance of payments disequilibria or 
diﬀerential inﬂation. The quid pro quo is that each individual 
change in the central rate should be small.16 The European ERM 
worked on this basis for the ﬁrst eight years of its existence 
and was quite successful in limiting intraregional exchange rate 
volatility.
If East Asian currencies that are currently pegged within 
narrow margins moved to a system of limited ﬂexibility, then 
they could evolve to some other system at a future date with-
out  foreclosing  their  options  prematurely  (i.e.,  now).  One 
possibility is that they would in due course be candidates for 
a monetary union, on the European model. In that event they 
might wish to create a parallel currency at an early date, as 
suggested by Eichengreen (2005), and the value of that parallel 
currency probably ought to be deﬁned as a basket exclusively 
of East Asian currencies. There is absolutely no contradiction 
between creating such a basket to determine the value of a 
parallel currency and using currency baskets that contain—
perhaps exclusively—extraregional currencies in order to peg 
or otherwise manage the exchange rates of regional currencies. 
These are two quite independent decisions, and either could 
be taken with or without the other. 
. . . a common basket would reduce 
the instability of China’s effective 
exchange rate even more. 
16. “Small” in this context means less than the width of the band so that 
potential speculators who are certain that they know the date and size
of a forthcoming central rate change still cannot be sure of making a proﬁt 
by speculation. N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1     A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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Another  possibility  is  that  East  Asian  countries  could 
move  to  ﬂoating  exchange  rates.  Most  countries  that  have 
adopted ﬂoating exchange rates did so because a crisis forced it 
on them. However, several of the countries that have started to 
ﬂoat without a costly crisis as part of the learning process—such 
as Chile, Israel, and Poland—used an intermediate regime to 
“learn to ﬂoat.” Or perhaps the outcome will diﬀer, with the 
large countries of northeast Asia—China and Korea—going 
to ﬂoating rates like Japan’s, while ASEAN eventually adopts 
a common currency. The point is that there is no need to peer 
into the future in order to adopt a policy that makes sense 
now. A common basket numeraire is compatible with evolu-
tion in either direction.
OBJECTIONS TO A BASKET NUMERAIRE
Some of the most common objections to a basket numeraire 
have already been discussed, and dismissed, in the preceding 
pages. For example, there is a view that a basket of currencies 
would be so formidably complicated that ordinary people, or 
even participants in the ﬁnancial markets, would have diﬃ-
culty in fathoming what was going on. This is not so: Many 
people may not understand what is involved when they have 
no need to understand it, and calculations can be messy, but 
the basic concepts are not diﬃcult, and people will quickly 
learn once they have an incentive to comprehend. Again, a 
lot of people seem to think that a basket peg implies that 
intervention would be conducted in a basket of currencies, 
but this is false, as pointed out above. Similarly, some seem to 
believe that adoption of a basket numeraire would necessarily 
imply a switch to holding reserves in a basket of currencies. 
This is again wrong: There is a case for making such a switch 
on grounds of reserve diversiﬁcation, but it is essentially inde-
pendent of whether a country stabilizes its exchange rate in 
terms of a single currency or a basket of currencies (or whether 
it ﬂoats).
Perhaps the most serious objection to a basket numeraire 
is that it would leave traders in the participating countries 
without  a  mechanism  for  ascertaining  the  local-currency 
value of trade contracts that will mature only in the future. 
An important advantage of a traditional peg to one of the 
main  international  currencies,  like  the  dollar,  is  that  trad-
ers can expect that a contract denominated in that currency 
will normally have an unchanged value in terms of the local 
currency when the contract matures. But denomination in 
some international currency cannot give them similar assur-
ance when their currency is no longer pegged to any inter-
national currency—for example, when it ﬂoats or when it is 
pegged to a basket. Thus when a country ﬂoats (or pegs to a 
basket) it is well advised to ensure the existence (or at least 
rapid development) of a forward market between the local 
currency and an international currency—in practice, the US 
dollar. This appears to be one of the main elements of China’s 
loudly proclaimed preparations for ﬂoating.
If each country pegged to a tailor-made basket, then 
each country would need its own forward market. Establishing 
such markets is unlikely to be diﬃcult in the case of the larger 
countries, but it may be problematic for the smaller ones. An 
advantage of a common basket peg is that only one forward 
market is needed to provide cover equivalent to that provided 
to  participating  countries  by  a  single-currency  peg  with  a 
reasonably narrow band. Essentially, the small countries could 
piggyback on the forward market that would be developed 
by the largest one, since all the exchange rates would move 
roughly in parallel relative to the dollar.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although  a  number  of  the  East  Asian  currencies  are  now 
nominally  ﬂoating,  the  extensive  intervention  they  have 
undertaken  in  recent  years  suggests  that  this  ﬂoat  is  very 
far from free ﬂoating. These countries intervene, it has been 
suggested,  mainly  because  of  a  collective  action  problem: 
They fear losing competitiveness vis-à-vis their regional peers, 
and they each had been reacting by pegging (many of them 
informally) to the dollar. This was a suboptimal reaction, as 
this brief has shown. A common basket numeraire would be 
better for everyone. N U M B E R   P B 0 5 - 1   A U G U S T   2 0 0 5
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